

Martedì

15 gennaio 2019

ore 12.00 - 13.30

Aula 12

Via Marcantonio Colonna, 19
Roma

Ciclo di seminari realizzati congiuntamente dal Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza, Economia, Politica e Lingue moderne e dal Dottorato in "Scienze dell'Economia civile"

Seminari di Economia civile

(Un)ethical behaviour, incentives and social interactions

Presenta

Matteo Rizzoli, Università LUMSA

In this seminar we will provide an introduction to the economic literature on cheating and we will present some specific results from a recent experiment concerning cheating in groups. In fact groups affect cheating in a variety of ways. However, it is still not clear whether members of a team cheat more or less if their individual actions are disclosed to their peers. To answer this question, we run a lab-in-the-field experiment with girl and boy scouts during their summer camps. Scout troops are organized in patrols: these are naturally occurring and persistent groups which own common goods and are much different from the minimal groups typically used in lab experiments. While we find a very low overall level of cheating, our results show that peer scrutiny induces more cheating in teams. This novel result is somehow in contrast with other studies showing that hierarchical scrutiny decreases cheating. Furthermore our results suggest that this adverse peer effect is independent from whether cheating rewards the team or the individual.

Discutono

Dalila de Rosa e Maria Francesca Cavalcanti (Dottorato di Economia Civile)